Estados Unidos no cree que la SEDENA pueda combatir eficazmente al narco, pero si respeta la labor que ha venido haciendo la Marina, a la que elogia tras la operación que condujo a la captura y muerte de Arturo Beltrán Leyva. En varios cables publicados por Wikileaks se informa que una semana antes del asesinato de Beltrán Leyva, la embajada estadounidense envió información detallada sobre su ubicación del capo.
Un cable refiere que:
"The SEMAR unit has been trained extensively by NORTHCOM over the past several years a SEMAR" (...) SEMAR is well-trained, well-equipped, and has shown itself capable of responding quickly to actionable intelligence. Its success puts the Army (SEDENA) in the difficult position of explaining why it has been reluctant to act on good intelligence and conduct operations against high-level targets. The U.S. interagency originally provided the information to SEDENA, whose refusal to move quickly reflected a risk aversion that cost the institution a major counternarcotics victory. SEDENA did provide backup to SEMAR during the firefight with ABL forces, but can take little credit for the operation. Public Security Secretary (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna can also be counted as a net loser in the Mexican interagency following the ABL operation. SSP considers high-level Beltran Leyva targets to be its responsibility, and Garcia Luna has already said privately that the operation should have been his".
Para Estados Unidos (y para la mayoría de los mexicanos) García Luna es un perdedor! Pero en otro cable Estados Unidos apunta que "The command change in Juarez has been seen by political classes and the public as a Presidential repudiation of SEDENA. When SEDENA joins you at the DBWG, it will be an agency smarting from the very public statement of a lack of confidence in its performance record in Juarez (...) Below the surface of military professionalism, there is also considerable tension between SEDENA and SEMAR. SEMAR succeeded in the take down of Arturo Beltran Leyva, as well as with other major targets. Aside from the perceived failure of its mission in Juarez, SEDENA has come to be seen slow and risk averse even where it should succeed: the mission to capture HVTs. The risk is that the more SEDENA is criticized, the more risk averse it will become. The challenge you face in the DBWG is to convince them that modernization and not withdrawal are the way forward, and that transparency and accountability are fundamental to modernization. There is no alternative in today's world of information technology".
El mismo cable refiere a los numerosos abusos y violaciones a los derechos humanos cometidos por los militares, Estados Unidos afirma que la SEDENA no tiene autoridad para realizar arrestos y es incapaz de procesar la información y las pruebas para su uso en casos judiciales. Estados Unidos tambien se compromete actuar cuidadosamente en materia de derechos humanos en el DBWG. Las presentaciones del lado de EE.UU. sobre cómo los derechos humanos desempeñan en nuestra conducta de la política militar y de seguridad será constructivo.
Y esto porque "Los militares no estaban preparados para patrullar las calles o imponer la ley. No tienen la autoridad para recoger pruebas y presentarlas ante la judicatura. Resultado: las detenciones se disparan pero las acusaciones se mantienen invariables y tanto los militares como ciudadanos están cada vez más frustrados", dice el cable donde también se hace referencia a Amnistía Internacional que en diciembre apuntó que las denuncias a la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos contra el ejército pasó de 367 en 2007 a más de 2000 a partir de junio del 2008 a 2009.
"It has taken a serious beating on human rights issues from international and domestic human rights organizations, who argue with considerable basis, in fact that the military is ill-equipped for a domestic policing role. While SEDENA has moved to address human rights criticisms, its efforts are mechanistic and wrapped in a message that often transmits defensiveness about bringing a hermetically sealed military culture into the twenty-first century. The military justice system (fuero militar) is used not only for a legitimate prosecutorial function, but also to preserve the military's institutional independence. Even the Mexican Supreme Court will not claim civilian jurisdiction over crimes involving the military, regardless of whether a military mission is involved. Fortunately, the Mexican military is under increasing pressure to change on a number of fronts. A recent Inter-American Human Rights Court ruling found Article 57 of Mexico's code of military justice, which effectively allows the military to keep all violators within its own justice system, violate Mexico's constitution and mandated improvements in the way cases involving alleged human rights abuses by the military are handled".
En un apartado subtitulado "Militares clave de Modernización", Estados Unidos dice que gracias a su ayuda, México "ha perfeccionado su estrategia de lucha contra la delincuencia que incluye la inauguración de un nuevo comando de la Policía Federal y centro de inteligencia, el establecimiento de mecanismos más fuertes de investigación para conocer los antecedentes de funcionarios de seguridad, la construcción de bases de datos de intercambio de información para proporcionar datos en la lucha contra el narco a varios elementos federales, estatales y locales".
"These steps reflect the GOM's willingness to respond to public pressure and to focus on building strong, civilian law enforcement institutions that are necessary for sustained success against organized crime in Mexico. Indeed, Public Security Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna has sought to raise the standards of his Federal Police so it is capable of gradually replacing the military's role in public security through improved hiring, training, and vetting practices. With new authorities granted under federal police reform legislation passed last year, including a broadened wire-tapping mandate, the SSP is well-placed to significantly expand its investigative and intelligence-collection capabilities. The GOM is exploring new ways to bring local and state police up to standards to support the anti-crime fight. Federal judicial reform has been slower in coming, but the Attorney General's Office (PGR) is looking to modernize as an institution. For example, PGR created with USG assistance the Constanza Project (Justicia Para Todos), a $200 million dollar initiative designed to transform PGR's culture, in part by promoting transparency, training attorneys to build stronger cases, and digitizing files in order to incorporate a paperless system less susceptible to corruption".
Pero el proyecto Constanza que incluye $200 millones para transformar la cultura de la PGR no es todo, también se afirma que la asistencia del gobierno de Estados Unidos ha sido fundamental para estos esfuerzos, y buscan "ayudar" a México a construir instituciones sin fisuras en las operaciones, las investigaciones, la inteligencia, los procesamientos y condenas. Y que México también se ha comprometido a estudiar un modelo de grupo de tareas de inteligencia y operaciones conjuntas, el CISEN se ha encargado de supervisar estos esfuerzos. Pretenden apoyar el desarrollo institucional de la Policía Federal, la capacidad de formación y la aplicación rápida de la reforma judicial. Rematando que gran parte de los esfuerzos incluyen el trabajo a nivel estatal.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario